Students and observers of communism consistently encounter the
same paradox: On the one hand they attempt to predict the future
of communism, yet on the other they must regularly face up to a
system that appears unusually static. At academic gatherings and
seminars, and in scholarly treatises, one often hears and reads
that communist systems are marred by economic troubles, power
sclerosis, ethnic upheavals, and that it is only a matter of time
before communism disintegrates. Numerous authors and observers
assert that communist systems are maintained in power by the
highly secretive nomenklatura, which consists of party potentates
who are intensely disliked by the entire civil society. In
addition, a growing number of authors argue that with the
so-called economic linkages to Western economies, communist
systems will eventually sway into the orbit of liberal
democracies, or change their legal structure to the point where
ideological differences between liberalism and communism will
become almost negligible.
The foregoing analyses and predictions about communism are flatly
refuted by Alexander Zinoviev, a Russian sociologist, logician,
and satirist, whose analyses of communist systems have gained
remarkable popularity among European conservatives in the last
several years.(1)
According to Zinoviev, it is impossible to study communist systems
without rigorous employment of appropriate methodology, training
in logic, and a construction of an entirely new conceptual
approach. Zinoviev contends that Western observers of communism
are seriously mistaken in using social analyses and a conceptual
framework appropriate for studying social phenomena in the West,
but inappropriate for the analysis of communist systems. He
writes:
A camel cannot exist if one places upon it the criteria of a
hippopotamus. The opinion of those in the West who consider the
Soviet society unstable, and who hope for its soon disintegration
from within (aside that they take their desires for realities), is
in part due to the fact that they place upon the phenomenon of
Soviet society criteria of Western societies, which are alien to
the Soviet society.(2)
Zinoviev's main thesis is that an average citizen living in a
communist system -- whom he labels homo sovieticus -- behaves and
responds to social stimuli in a similar manner to the way his
Western counterpart responds to stimuli of his own social
landscape. In practice this means that in communist systems the
immense majority of citizens behave, live, and act in accordance
with the logic of social entropy laid out by the dominating
Marxist ideology. Contrary to widespread liberal beliefs, social
entropy in communism is by no means a sign of the system's
terminal illness; in fact it is a positive sign that the system
has developed to a social level that permits its citizenry to
better cope with the elementary threats, such as wars, economic
chaos, famines, or large-scale cataclysms. In short, communism is
a system whose social devolution has enabled the masses of
communist citizens to develop defensive mechanisms of political
self-protection and indefinite biological survival. Using an
example that recalls Charles Darwin and Konrad Lorenz, Zinoviev
notes that less-developed species often adapt to their habitat
better than species with more intricate biological and behavioral
capacities. On the evolutionary tree, writes Zinoviev, rats and
bugs appear more fragile than, for example, monkeys or dinosaurs,
yet in terms of biological survivability, bugs and rats have
demonstrated and astounding degree of adaptability to an endlessly
changing and threatening environment. The fundamental mistake of
liberal observers of communism is to equate political efficiency
with political stability. There are political systems that are
efficient, but are at the same time politically unstable; and
conversely, there are systems which are resilient to external
threats. To illustrate the stability of communist systems,
Zinoviev writes:
A social system whose organization is dominated by
entropic
principles possesses a high level of stability.
Communist
society is indeed such a type of association of millions
of
people in a common whole and secure survival, for a more
comfortable course of life, and for a favorable position
of
success.(3)
Zinoviev notes that to "believe in communism" by no means implies
only the adherence to the ruling communist elite or the
unquestionable acceptance of the communist credo. The belief in
communism presupposes first and foremost a peculiar mental
attitude whose historical realization has been made possible as a
result of primordial egalitarian impulses congenial to all human
beings. Throughout man's biocultural evolution, egalitarian
impulses have been held in check by cultural endeavors and
civilizational constraints, yet with the advent of mass
democracies, resistance to these impulses has become much more
difficult. Here is how Zinoviev sees communism:
Civilization is an effort; communality is taking the line
if
least resistance. Communism is the unruly conduct of
nature's
elemental forces; civilization sets them rational
bounds.
It is for this reason that it is the greatest mistake to
think
that communism deceives the masses or uses force on them.
As
the flower and crowning glory of communality, communism
represents a type of society which is nearest and dearest
to
the masses no matter how dreadful the potential
consequences
for them might be.(4)
Zinoviev refutes the widespread belief that communist power is
vested only among party officials, or the so-called nomenklatura.
As dismal as the reality of communism is, the system must be
understood as a way of life shared by millions of government
officials, workers, and countless ordinary people scattered in
their basic working units, whose chief function is to operate as
protective pillars of the society. Crucial to the stability of the
communist system is the blending of the party and the people into
one whole, and as Zinoviev observes, "the Soviet saying [that] the
party and the people are one and the same, is not just a
propagandistic password."(5) The Communist Party is only the
repository of an ideology whose purpose is not only to further the
objectives of the party members, but primarily to serve as the
operating philosophical principle governing social conduct.
Zinoviev remarks that Catholicism in the earlier centuries not
only served the Pope and clergy; it also provided a pattern of
social behavior for countless individuals irrespective of their
personal feelings toward Christian dogma. Contrary to the
assumption of liberal theorists, in communist societies the
cleavage between the people and the party is almost nonexistent
since rank-and-file party members are recruited from all walks of
life and not just from one specific social stratum. To speculate
therefore about a hypothetical line that divides the rulers from
the ruled, writes Zinoviev in his usual paradoxical tone, is like
comparing how "a disemboweled and carved out animal, destined for
gastronomic purposes, differs from its original biological
whole."(6)
Admittedly, continues Zinoviev, per capita income is three to four
times lower than in capitalist democracies, and as the daily
drudgery and bleakness of communist life indicates, life under
communism falls well short of the promised paradise. Yet, does
this necessarily indicate that the overall quality in a communist
society is inferior to that in Western countries? If one considers
that an average worker in a communist system puts in three to four
hours on his work (for which he usually never gets reprimanded,
let alone fears losing his job), then his earnings make the
equivalent of the earnings of a worker in a capitalist democracy.
Stated in Marxist terminology, a worker in a communist system is
not economically exploited but instead "takes the liberty" of
allocating to himself the full surplus value of his labor which
the state is unable to allocate to him.(7) Hence this popular
joke, so firmly entrenched in communist countries, which vividly
explains the longevity of the communist way of life: "Nobody can
pay me less than as little as I can work."
Zinoviev dismisses the liberal reductionist perception of
economics, which is based on the premise that the validity or
efficiency of a country is best revealed by its high economic
output or workers' standard of living. In describing the economics
of the Soviet Union, he observes that "the economy in the Soviet
Union continues to thrive, regardless of the smart analyses and
prognoses of the Western experts, and is in fact in the process of
becoming stronger."(8) The endless liberal speculations about the
future of communism, as well as the frequent evaluations about
whether capitalist economies are more efficient than communist
economies, are pure nonsense because they do not take into account
the long-term benefits that a communist economy may yield in the
future:
It is not yet known -- when one observes a society in
its
entirety -- where is the social effectively of labor
superior;
in the West or in the Soviet Union. It is not to be
excluded
that in this aspect the Soviet Union has come out ahead.
The
results will be only known in several centuries.(9)
Zinoviev points out that aside from a guaranteed wage, a worker in
a communist society also enjoys full economic security and
predictable social conditions, which liberal systems, if they wish
to remain competitive, are hardly able to afford. And as to the
perennial question of liberty versus equality, it also remains
debatable whether the majority of people under communism would be
more willing to forfeit their guaranteed security for the often
arduous path to liberty. In fact, no matter how impoverished
communist countries may appear, or still may become, they will
always guarantee a modicum of security even for the most destitute
citizens. For Zinoviev, security and predictability are the
fundamental pillars of communist longevity, two factors which will
continue to exert a tremendous attraction, even for those who
would usually define themselves as "anticommunists." In short,
despite universal disenchantment with Marxism, the legacy of the
gulag, Stalin's purges, and recurrent repressions, communism, as
the most successful form of egalitarianism, has lost little of its
attractiveness.
Numerous attempts at democratizing communism, that is, by
bestowing it with a "human face," have in reality always
symbolized the desire for more "real" communism and less "false"
communism. In practice, however, such attempts have invariably
resulted in patent failures. The more communism changes the more
in fact it remains the same. Yet, despite its visible
shortcomings, the communist ideal will likely continue to flourish
precisely because it successfully projects the popular demand for
security and predictability. By contrast, the fundamental weakness
of liberal systems is that they have introduced the principles of
security and predictability only theoretically and legally, but
for reasons of economic efficiency, have so far been unable to put
them into practice. For Claude Polin, a French author whose
analyses of communist totalitarianism closely parallel Zinoviev's
views, the very economic inefficiency of communism paradoxically,
"provides much more chances to [sic] success for a much larger
number of individuals than a system founded on competition and
reward of talents."(10) Communism, in short, liberates each
individual from all social effort and responsibility, and its
internal stasis only reinforces its awesome political stability.
TERROR AS THE METAPHOR
For Zinoviev, communist terror essentially operates according to
the laws of dispersed communalism; that is, through the
decentralization of power into the myriad of workers' collectives.
As the fundamental linchpins of communism, these collectives carry
out not only coercive but also remunerative measures on behalf of
and against their members. Upon joining a collective, each person
becomes a transparent being who is closely scrutinized by his
coworkers, yet at the same time enjoys absolute protection in
cases of professional mistakes, absenteeism, shoddy work, and so
forth. In such a system it is not only impossible but also
counterproductive to contemplate a coup or a riot because the
power of collectives is so pervasive that any attempted dissent is
likely to hurt the dissenter more than his collective. Seen on the
systemic level, communist terror, therefore, does not emanate from
one central source, but from a multitude of centers from the
bottom to the top of society, whose foundations, in additions to
myriad of collectives, are made up of "basic units," brigades, or
pioneer organizations. If perchance an individual or a group of
people succeeds in destroying one center of power, new centers of
power will automatically emerge. In this sense, the notion of
"democratic centralism," derided by many liberal observers as just
another verbal gimmick of the communist meta-language, signifies a
genuine example of egalitarian democracy -- a democracy in which
power derives not from the party but from the people. Zinoviev
notes:
Even if you wipe out half the population, the first thing
that
will be restored in the remaining half will be the system
of
power and administration. There, power is not organized
to
serve the population: the population is organized as a
material required for the functioning of power.(11)
Consequently, it does not appear likely that communism can ever be
"improved," at least not as Westerners understand improvement,
because moral, political, and economic corruption of communism is
literally spread throughout all pores of the society, and is in
fact encouraged by the party elite on a day-to-day basis. The
corruption among workers that takes the form of absenteeism,
moonlighting, and low output goes hand in hand with corruption and
licentiousness of party elites, so that the corruption of the one
justifies and legitimatizes the corruption of the others. That
communism is a system of collective irresponsibility is indeed not
just an empty saying.
IN THE LAND OF THE “WOODEN LANGUAGE”
The corruption of language in communist societies is a phenomenon
that until recently has not been sufficiently explored.(12)
According to an elaborate communist meta-language that Marxist
dialecticians have skillfully developed over the last hundred
years, dissidents and political opponents do not fall into the
category of "martyrs," or "freedom fighters" -- terms usually
applied to them by Western well-wishers, yet terms which are
meaningless in the communist vernacular. Not only for the party
elite, but for the overwhelming majority of people, dissidents are
primarily traitors of democracy, occasionally branded as "fascist
agents" or proverbial "CIA spies." In any case, as Zinoviev
indicates, the number of dissidents is constantly dwindling, while
the number of their detractors is growing to astounding
proportions. Moreover, the process of expatriation of dissidents
is basically just one additional effort to dispose of undesirable
elements, and thereby secure a total social consensus.
For the masses of citizens, long accustomed to a system
circumventing al political "taboo themes," the very utterance of
the word dissident creates the feeling of insecurity and
unpredictability. Consequently, before dissidents turn into
targets of official ostracism and legal prosecution, most people,
including their family members, will often go to great lengths to
disavow them. Moreover, given the omnipotent and transparent
character of collectives and distorted semantics, potential
dissidents cannot have a lasting impact of society. After all, who
wants to be associated with somebody who in the popular jargon is
a nuisance to social peace and who threatens the already
precarious socioeconomic situation of a system that has only
recently emerged from the long darkness of terror? Of course, in
order to appear democratic the communist media will often
encourage spurious criticism of the domestic bureaucracy, economic
shortages, or rampant mismanagement, but any serious attempt to
question the tenets of economic determinism and the Marxist
vulgate will quickly be met with repression. In a society premised
on social and psychological transparency, only when things get out
of hand, that is, when collectives are no longer capable of
bringing a dissident to "his senses," -- which at any rate is
nowadays a relatively rare occurrence -- the police step in.
Hence the phenomenon of citizens' self-surveillance, so typical
of all communist societies, which largely explains the stability
of the system.
In conclusion, the complexity of the communist enigma remains
awesome, despite some valid insights by sovietologists and other
related scholars. In fact, one reason why the study of communist
society is still embryonic may be ascribed to the constant
proliferation of sovietologists, experts, and observers, who
seldom share a unanimous view of the communist phenomenon. Their
true expertise, it appears, is not the analysis of the Soviet
Union, but rather how to refute each other's expertise on the
Soviet Union. The merit of Zinoviev's implacable logic is that the
abundance of false diagnoses and prognoses of communism results in
part from liberal's own unwillingness to combat social entropy and
egalitarian obsession on their own soil and within their own
ranks. If liberal systems are truly interested in containing
communism, they must first reexamine their own egalitarian
premises and protocommunist appetites.
What causes communism? Why does communism still appear so
attractive (albeit in constantly new derivatives) despite its
obvious empirical bankruptcy? Why cannot purportedly democratic
liberalism come to terms with its ideological opponents despite
visible economic advantages? Probably one should first examine the
dynamics of all egalitarian and economic beliefs and doctrines,
including those of liberalism, before one starts criticizing the
gulags and psychiatric hospitals.
Zinoviev rejects the notion that the Soviet Union is an empire in
decline, beset by ethnic troubles, or on the verge of economic
collapse. He flatly denounces all prophecies about the imminent
demise of communism, and in fact has argued that such prognoses
are based on wishful thinking. Moreover, he points out that the
decline of the Soviet prestige is accompanied by an increase in
Soviet real influence. Following his logic, the Soviet Union may
"lose" Afghanistan, but may gain a foothold in central and east
Asia; it may scarp missiles in Eastern Europe, but may receive
high-tech gifts from complacent Western governments. One must not
forget that it is not the Soviet Union that is desperate to buy
grain from America, but U.S. farmers who are desperate to sell
grain to the Soviet Union -- and when necessary even below the
internationally fixed market price.
Zinoviev challenges the conventional notion that communism is
threatened by economic mismanagement, popular dissatisfaction, or
inability to compete with liberalism. Quite on the contrary.
Communism is at its best when it faces economic difficulties,
famines, or long queues. It is a system designed for simplicity of
life and economic frugality. For that matter, even the perennial
question of whether the party and the people still believe in the
communist ideology is of little importance. In any case, both the
party and the people will believe in the communist credo as long
as it can further their own individual or group goals. After all,
the communist dialectics consists precisely in the phenomenal
capability of the ideology to readjust itself to each new epoch,
as well as to each new intellectual reinterpretation.
For contemporary readers, Zinoviev's analyses may often appear
contradictory. In an age of glasnost, one is tempted to believe
that communist systems are genuinely interested in change. But
when one reverses this assumption, glasnost may also be
interpreted as the turning point for communism, that is, a sign of
total political consolidation that can now freely permit all kinds
of liberal experiments. After all, what threatens communism?
Regardless of what the future holds for communist societies, one
must agree with Zinoviev that the much-vaunted affluence of the
West is not necessarily a sign of Western stability. The constant
reference to affluence, as the sole criterion for judging
political systems, does not often seem persuasive. The received
wisdom among (American) conservatives is that the United States
must outgun or outspend the Soviet Union to convince the Soviets
that capitalism is a superior system. Conservatives and others
believe that with this show of affluence, Soviet leaders will
gradually come to the conclusion that their systems is obsolete.
Yet in the process of competition, liberal democracies may ignore
other problems. If one settles for the platitude that the Soviet
society is economically bankrupt, then one must also acknowledge
that the United States is the world's largest debtor and that
another crash on Wall Street may well lead to the further appeal
of various socialistic and pseudosocialist beliefs. Liberal
society, despite its material advantages, constantly depends on
its "self-evident" economic miracles. Such a society, particularly
when it seeks peace at any price, may some day realize that there
is also an impossibly high price to pay in order to preserve it.
Notes:
1. Alexander Zinoviev is an ethnic Russian who teaches and resides in West Germany. He is not related to Grigorii Zinoviev (Ovsi Aronovic), head of the Third international and a victim of Stalin’s purges. A. Zinoviev’s literary talent has often been compared with that of Jonathan Swift and Louis Ferdinand Céline.
2. Alexander Sinowjew, Die Diktatur der Logik (München, Zürich: Piper, 1985), 148. The phoneme “z” corresponds to the German “s.”
3. Die Diktatur der Logik, 145.
4. Zinoviev, The Reality of Communism (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1984), 28.
5. Die Macht des Unglaubens: Anmerkungen zur Sowjet-Ideologie (München, Zürich: Piper, 1986), 24.
6. Die Macht, 25.
7. Zinoviev, The Reality of Communism, 98-100.
8. Zinoviev, Die Diktatur, 64.
9. Die Diktatur, 65.
10. Claude Polin, Le totalitarisme (Paris: PUF, 1982), 89.
11. Zinoviev, Homo Sovieticus (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1985), 80.
12. See Françoise Thom, La langue de bois (Paris: Julliard, 1987).
